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Abstract
Evaluating a neural network on an input that differs markedly
from the training data might cause erratic and flawed predictions. We
study a method that judges the unusualness of an input by evaluating
its informative content compared to the learned parameters. This
technique can be used to judge whether a network is suitable for
processing a certain input and to raise a red flag that unexpected
behavior might lie ahead. We compare our approach to various methods
for uncertainty evaluation from the literature for various datasets and
scenarios. Specifically, we introduce a simple, effective method that
allows to directly compare the output of such metrics for single input
points even if these metrics live on different scales.
1 Introduction
The reliability and performance of a
machine learning algorithm depends
crucially on the data that were used
for training it [2]. Having an incom-
plete training set or encountering in-
put data that have unprecedented de-
viations might lead to unexpected, er-
roneous behavior [3, 4, 5]. In this
work we consider the task of judging
whether an input to a neural network,
trained for classification, is unusual
in the sense that it is different from
the training data. For this purpose
we consider a quantity based on the
Fisher information matrix [6]. A simi-
lar quantity was shown by the authors
to be useful for the related task of de-
tecting adversarial examples [7]. Two
kinds of scenarios are studied:
• The input data were modified,
e.g. by being noisy or contorted.
• The training set is incomplete,
by missing some structural com-
ponent that will emerge in prac-
tice.
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Figure 1: An image showing the sea from the Intel Image Classification dataset [1] in
its original form (left), after inverting its green color channel in RGB format (middle)
and after adding Gaussian noise (right). Below we denote the prediction yˆ of the neural
network from Section 3.1 together with its error probability 1− p(yˆ|x) and the quantity
〈Fθ(x)〉 based on the Fisher information we introduce in Section 2. We observe in this
example that the naive error probability can be misleading, while the Fisher information
indicates an unusual input due to its value close to 100%.
Our considerations are carried out along
various datasets and in comparison
with related methods from the liter-
ature. In particular, we present an
easy and efficient method to directly
compare different metrics that judge
the uncertainty behind a prediction.
We consider neural networks that
are trained for classifying inputs into
C classes 1, . . . , C. After application
of a softmax activation the output of
a neural network for an input x can
be read as a vector of probabilities
(pθ(y|x))y=1,...,C , where we wrote θ for
the parameters of the neural network
(usually weights and biases) [8]. The
class yˆ where this vector is maximal is
then the prediction of the network. It
is quite tempting to consider pθ(yˆ|x)
as a measure for the confidence behind
this prediction. The leftmost column
of Figure 1 shows an image from the
Intel Image Classification dataset [1]
and the output of a neural network
that was trained on it, details will
follow in Section 3 below. The image
is classified correctly as “sea” with
p(yˆ|x) = 98.8%. In this article we are
more interested in the probability of
misclassification
1− p(yˆ|x) = 1.2% . (1)
One might expect that the higher this
probability, the more unreliable is the
prediction of the network. The second
column of Figure 1 shows the same im-
age but with with an inverted green
color channel. While the classification
remains“sea”, the probability of error
rises to 14.1% which appears to be a
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sensible behavior. Unfortunately, the
behavior of the output probability is
not always meaningful. The rightmost
column of Figure 1 shows the same pic-
ture with Gaussian noise added. The
image is misclassified as showing a
“forest” but with a quite small error
probability 1− p(yˆ|x) of around 2.1%.
The fact that the softmax probability
is not fully exhaustive or even mislead-
ing in judging the reliability of the
prediction of the network led to vari-
ous developments in the literature like
a Bayesian judgement of uncertainty
[9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] and deep
ensembles [16]. We here study the be-
havior of a quantity, called the Fisher
form and denoted by Fθ, that evalu-
ates if the input x differs from what
the network “has learned”. Fθ(x) was
introduced by the authors, with slight
modifications, for the purpose of ad-
versarial detection [17, 18] for the first
time in [7]. Below Figure 1 we listed
the values of 〈Fθ(x)〉, where 〈. . .〉 de-
notes some normalization we intro-
duce below. As we see in Figure 1
〈Fθ(x)〉 shows a quite natural behav-
ior on the depicted images, where val-
ues close to 100% indicate an unusual
input.
This article is structured as follows:
In Section 2 we introduce, and moti-
vate, the method used in this article
and introduce the normalization that
allows us to compare different metrics.
Section 3 presents the results for vari-
ous datsets and splits in two halfs: in
Subsection 3.1 we study the effect of
modifying the input, while Subsection
3.2 considers the case where the train-
ing data lack some structural aspects.
Finally we provide some conclusions
and an outlook for future research.
2 Method
A slightly more complete summary of
the output probabilities than (1) can
be gained by considering the entropy
instead [6, 12]:
Hθ(x)=−
C∑
y=1
pθ(y|x) log pθ(y|x). (2)
If the entropy is high the output prob-
abilities (p(y|x))y=1,...,C are roughly
equal in magnitude and the predic-
tion is uncertain. Hθ(x) suffers still
from the same drawback than pθ(yˆ|x):
Specifically, it completely ignores the
uncertainties of θ and uses their point
estimates only. One way around this
problem is to use another, more elab-
orate distribution such as an approxi-
mate to the posterior predictive or a
mixed distribution from a deep ensem-
ble.
In [7] the authors introduced a
quantity that gives a deeper insight
than (2) and is based on the Fisher
information. The Fisher information
matrix for a neural network with out-
put pθ(y|x) for an input x and a p-
dimensional parameter θ equals Fθ(x) =∑C
y=1∇θpθ(y|x)·∇θ log pθ(y|x)T . Even
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Figure 2: Using the normalization (5) we can directly compare the behavior of 1− p(yˆ|x)
from (1), the entropy Hθ(x) from (2) and the Fisher form Fθ(x) from (3) and ignore the
fact that these quantities live on different scales. The histograms depict the behavior of
these quantities for images from the Intel Image Classification dataset [1] unmodified (in
green) and after inverting the green color channel (in magenta) as in the middle of Fig. 1.
a smaller network has around p = 106
parameters, which makes Fθ a matrix
with 1012 entries and is thus, in prac-
tice, infeasible. A way out, proposed
in [7], is to consider the effect of this
matrix in a specific direction v, i.e. to
consider the quadratic form
Fθ(x) = vTFθ(x)v , (3)
where v has the same dimensionality
as θ. We will refer to (3) as the Fisher
form. The quantity (3) measures how
much information is gained/lost in a
(small) step in the direction v. More
precisely, the Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence between pθ(y|x) and pθ+εv(y|x)
can be written as ε
2
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Fθ(x)+O(ε3) [19].
After the parameter θ is learned, this
divergence will be large for x that
are informative, that is different from
those used to infer the learned value of
θ. To use (3) we have to fix a suitable
direction v. A natural choice, which
we will use throughout this article, is
the negative gradient of the entropy
v = −∂θHθ(x) , (4)
where Hθ(x) is as in (2). The moti-
vation behind a choice like (4) is as
follows: Once trained the network will
produce for an input the highest prob-
ability for one class yˆ, its “prediction”,
and lower probabilities for all other
classes y 6= yˆ. The vector v then de-
notes the direction in parameter space
that decreases the entropy, in other
words that tends to increase the prob-
ability for yˆ further and to decrease
all other probabilities.
If the input is unusual and leads
to a wrong classification yˆ, then a step
in the direction of v will increase the
information substantially, as the used
x will usually be completely different
from the training data that were used
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for inferring θ. For another choice of
v compare [7].
Taking the expression Fθ(x) has
the useful consequence that we can
rewrite the quadratic form in (3) as
Fθ(x)=
∑C
y=1Dvpθ(y|x)Dvlog pθ(y|x),
where Dvf(θ) = v
T∇θf(θ) denotes
the directional derivative w.r.t θ in di-
rection of v, which can be computed
either directly or using a finite differ-
ence approximation that avoids the
need for backpropagation [7].
Before analyzing how the quantity
(3) performs in practice, there is one
final point that needs some consider-
ation. While quantities such as the
Fisher form (3) or the entropy (2) can
each be compared for two different
datapoints there is no direct possi-
bility for a comparison between the
value of the entropy and the Fisher
information for the same datapoint.
Moreover, requiring someone apply-
ing these quantities to get an intuition
first before they can judge whether a
quantity is “high enough” to rise sus-
picion is rather unsatisfactory.
When faced with a binary deci-
sion problem, such as “will produce
unexpected behavior or not”, we can
use the receiver operator character-
istic (ROC) and the associated area
under the ROC curve (AUC) to com-
pare different metrics, cf., for example
[7]. However, a comparison based on
the ROC/AUC still has the drawback
that it is not applicable for single dat-
apoints and, moreover, that not all
problems can be seen as a binary deci-
sion. We here describe a rather easy,
yet efficient approach that solves these
issues. Let us introduce the following
normalization for a quantity q(x) and
a test set T
〈q(x)〉 = #{x
′ in T s.t. q(x′) < q(x)}
#{x′ in T} ,
(5)
where # counts the number of ele-
ments. In other words 〈q(x)〉 denotes
fraction of test samples x′ in T for
which q(x′) < q(x). By construction,
〈q(x)〉 depends on the input x and on
the test set T that is used. This nor-
malization has a few nice properties:
It is
• bounded, as it lies always be-
tween 0 and 1,
• monotone: from q(x1) < q(x2)
it follows 〈q(x1)〉 < 〈q(x2)〉,
• invariant under strictly mono-
tone transformations such as tak-
ing a logarithm or scaling.
This normalization allows us to com-
pare different measures of reliability/
uncertainty, since relations such as
〈Fθ(x)〉 = 75% and 〈Hθ(x)〉 = 75%
have a similar meaning: 75% of the
test samples have a smaller value than
the one for x. If we see the magni-
tude of a quantity such as Fθ(x) as
an indicator for the “unusualness” of
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Figure 3a: Behavior of the normalized en-
tropies 〈Hθ(xλ)〉, 〈HGDθ (xλ)〉, 〈HDEθ (xλ)〉 for
the softmax output, Gaussian dropout and a
deep ensemble (in black, blue and cyan) and
the Fisher form 〈Fθ(xλ)〉 (in purple) when
interpolating two images from the MNIST
dataset [20] using a variational autoencoder.
xλ and λ are as in (6). The small crosses
indicate the classification as 4 (in green) and
9 (in blue)
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Figure 3b: Behavior of the normalized en-
tropies 〈Hθ(xλ)〉, 〈HGDθ (xλ)〉, 〈HDEθ (xλ)〉 for
the softmax output, Bernoulli dropout and
a deep ensemble (in black, blue and cyan)
and the Fisher form 〈Fθ(xλ)〉 (in purple)
when pertubing an image from the Intel Im-
age Classification dataset by Gaussian noise.
xλ and λ are as in (7). The crosses indi-
cate whether the street has been classified
correctly (in green) or not (in red).
a datapoint x, then a value of 〈Fθ(x)〉
close to 100% can be seen as a strong
indication that the reliability for a
prediction based on x will be quite
questionable. In particular a relation
such as 〈Fθ(x)〉 > 〈Hθ(x)〉 for an x
that causes a wrong prediction will
indicate that Fθ(x) detected the un-
derlying uncertainty more clearly than
Hθ(x) (based on the test set), so that
a normalization via 〈. . .〉 make mea-
sures of reliability directly compara-
ble.
Figure 2 shows the distribution
of 〈1 − pθ(yˆ|x)〉 (left), the normal-
ized version of (1), the normalized
entropy 〈Hθ(x)〉 (middle) and Fisher
form 〈Fθ(x)〉 (right) for the same neu-
ral network as in Figure 1 for the orig-
inal images (in green) and those with
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inverted green color channel (in ma-
genta). The test set for the normaliza-
tion was chosen equal to the test set
from [1]. Note that only the Fisher in-
formation has a distinct peak at high
values for the modified images.
3 Experiments
In this section we discuss the behavior
of the Fisher form Fθ, the entropy Hθ,
the entropy HDEθ for the mixture dis-
tribution predicted by a deep ensem-
ble [16] and the entropy HGD/BDθ of an
approximate to the posterior predic-
tive. More precisely, HDEθ refers to the
average of entropies produced by each
member of the ensemble, and HGD/BDθ
to the mean of entropies obtained by
repeated predictions of the trained net
using dropout. All deep ensembles
were constructed using 5 networks,
trained independently of each other.
To approximate the posterior predic-
tive we used Gaussian dropout [10]
for MNIST and Bernoulli dropout [9]
(with rate 0.5) for all other examples,
as the latter seemed to converge sub-
stantially faster. The entropy for the
distribution produced by the Gaus-
sian dropout will be denoted by HGDθ
and we will write HBDθ for Bernoulli
dropout. The architecture of all used
networks is sketched in the Appendix
of this article.
In Section 3.1 we will analyze the
behavior of Fθ,Hθ,HDEθ and HGD/BDθ
on datapoints that are modified, ei-
ther by adding noise or by a transfor-
mation based on a variational autoen-
coder. Section 3.2 studies the effect
of missing certain features while train-
ing.
3.1 Modified data
As a first example we will consider the
MNIST dataset [20] for digit recogni-
tion. We trained a convolutional neu-
ral network (Fig. 9a) for 25 epochs
until it reached an accuracy of around
99% on both, the test and training set.
Finally we trained a variational au-
toencoder (VAE) [11], sketched in Fig-
ure 9b, for 100 epochs until it reached
a mean squared error accuracy of around
1% of the pixel range. Using a VAE
is a popular form for interpolating
between datapoints [21, 22]. To this
end, we split the VAE into an encoder
E and a decoder D. For single in-
put images x˜0 and x˜1 we then take
z0 = E(x˜0), z1 = E(x˜1) and set for λ
between 0 and 1:
xλ = D(z0 + λ(z1 − z0)) . (6)
Figure 3a shows the interpolation be-
tween an image showing a 4 and an
image showing a 9 for different val-
ues of λ. The curves above the re-
constructed images show the depen-
dency of 〈Hθ(xλ)〉 (in black), 〈Fθ(xλ)〉
(in magenta), the Gaussian dropout
entropy 〈HGDθ (xλ)〉 (in blue) and the
deep ensemble entropy 〈HDEθ (xλ)〉 (in
cyan) on λ. We used the MNIST test
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set as the set T for normalization. All
methods show a similar behavior with
a distinct peak in the transition phase.
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Figure 4: The ROC for detecting whether
an image from the Intel Image Classification
dataset was modified by inverting its green
color channel (as in the middle of Figure
1) via the entropies Hθ(x), HBDθ (x), HDEθ (x)
(in black, blue and cyan) and the Fisher form
Fθ(x) (in purple)
As a next dataset we will consider
the Intel Image Classification dataset
[1] that contains images of 6 different
classes (street, building, forest, moun-
tain, glacier, sea). We touched this
example already in the introduction
of this article. We trained a convo-
lutional neural network (Fig. 10b)
on this dataset for 15 epochs until
it reached an accuracy of around 80%
on the test set of [1], which we also
used for normalization. We here want
to consider the effect of two modifica-
tions on the datapoints. The effect of
inverting the green color channel was
already shown in Figure 1 and Figure
2. This modification lets the accu-
racy of the network drop from around
80% to 30%. Figure 4 shows the ROC
for Hθ Fθ, HDEθ and HBDθ (now with
Bernoulli dropout) for detecting such
modified images, where we used once
more the test set as reference. Note
that a normalization as in (5) is not
needed as the ROC is invariant un-
der monotone transformations. The
AUC for Hθ and HBDθ are 0.63 and
0.72, while HDEθ and Fθ both share an
AUC of 0.76.
Next, we consider the effect of noise.
The upper plot in Figure 3b shows
the evolution of 〈Hθ(xλ)〉, 〈HBDθ (xλ)〉,
〈HDEθ (xλ)〉 and 〈Fθ(xλ)〉 where xλ is
now given as
xλ = x+ λ · ε , (7)
with x being a single image from the
Intel Image Classification dataset that
shows a street and with ε being an
array of standard normal noise of the
same shape as x. The lower row of
Figure 3b displays xλ for various λ.
The crosses in the upper plot in
Figure 3b depict if the network classi-
fies the image correctly as a street (in
green) or whether it chooses the wrong
class (in red). We observe that while
all quantities 〈Hθ(xλ)〉, 〈Fθ(xλ)〉, 〈HDEθ (xλ)〉
and 〈HBDθ (xλ)〉 share a similar trend,
the Fisher form, is well above all other
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quantities in the transition phase where
the noise starts flipping the classifica-
tion. Inspecting the maximal Soft-
max output p(yˆ|xλ) shows that be-
yond λ = 0.3 this probability is almost
identical to 1, which finally pushes all
quantities down towards 0.
3.2 Incomplete training data
While in Section 3.1 we looked at the
behavior of Fθ, Hθ, HDEθ and HGD/DEθ
for modified data, we will now analyze
another scenario. What happens if the
data we used in training was incom-
plete, in the sense that it lacked one
or several important features that will
occur in its application after training
[3, 24, 25]?
As a first example we use the Credit
Card Fraud Detection dataset [23, 26].
This, extremely unbalanced, dataset
contains 284,807 transactions with 492
frauds which are indicated by a binary
label. The data were anonymized us-
ing a principal component analysis.
The distribution of the main compo-
nent, dubbed ‘V1‘, is shown in Figure
5a. We split the data in two halfs.
A training set, where V1 is below a
threshold of -3.0 (in green), and a test
set where V1 is bigger than the thresh-
old (in red). On the green part we
trained, balancing the classes, a small
fully connected neural network (Fig.
10b) for 20 epochs until it reached an
accuracy of 95% on a smaller subset of
the “train” set that was excluded from
the training process. On the “test” set
from Figure 5a the accuracy is with
79% markedly lower.
Figure 5b shows the ROC for the
detection whether a datapoint x is
from the red part of Figure 5a based
onHθ(x), Fθ(x), HDEθ (x) andHBDθ (x).
The AUC for Fθ and HDEθ is around
0.70, while Hθ and HBDθ arrive both
at 0.63.
We will now consider a problem
where the splitting is more subtle and,
maybe, more realistic. For this pur-
pose we will use the DogsVsCats dataset
from [27]. We trained a variational au-
toencoder (Fig. 11b) [11] on the com-
bined collection of dog images from
[27, 28] for 30 epochs until it reached a
mean squared error accuracy of around
2% of the pixel range. A reconstructed
image can be seen in Figure 6a. We
then selected the bottleneck node, called
En from now on, that exhibits the
largest variance when evaluated on
these dog images. Figure 6b shows the
distribution of En for dog images from
[27] together with median(En) = 0.3.
What is the meaning of En? Figure 6c
shows the same reconstructed image
as in 6a but with flipped sign of En.
We can see that the background
of the depicted image becomes darker.
Looking at various datapoints from
the dataset hardens this impression so
that we will see this as the “meaning”
of En, although there is, probably, no
one-to-one correspondence with a hu-
man interpretation. We trained a con-
9
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Figure 5a: Distribution of the main
PCA component V1 from the Credit
Card Fraud Detection dataset [23]. We
split this dataset in two parts, where one
is used for training a neural network (in
green) and the other one for testing on
unusualness (in red) using the metrics
from Section 2.
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Figure 5b: ROC for detecting whether
a datapoint is from the red or green area
in Figure 5a using the entropy (in black),
the uncertainty computed from a deep
ensemble (in blue) and the Fisher form
(in purple).
volutional neural network (Fig. 11a)
on the data from [27], but by omitting
those dog images with
En < median(En) = 0.3 , (8)
i.e. those on the left side of the median
in Figure 6b or, with the interpreta-
tion above, those images with dark
background. We trained this network
for 20 epochs until it reached an accu-
racy of around 80% on a subset of the
images with En ≥ median(En) that
we ignored while training. Evaluating
now the network on dog images from
[27, 28] with En < median(En) lets
the accuracy drop to 1%! In other
words almost all dogs images with
En < 0.3 are classified as cats. Our
task is now to detect whether an in-
put is unusual in the sense that (8)
holds. Figure 7 depicts the evolution
of the AUC for the quantities Fθ, Hθ,
HDEθ and HBDθ for each epoch and the
accuracy of the trained network (in
dashed gray). The difference between
the Fisher form Fθ and all other forms
is striking. The quantities based on
entropy seem to completely fail in de-
tecting the “unusualness” of images
with En < 0.3. In fact they yield
AUCs below 0.5, thereby marking the
actual training images as more sus-
picious than the modified images on
which the classification actually fails.
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Figure 6a: Output of the
used VAE for a dog im-
age from DogsVsCats dataset
[27] where the variable in la-
tent space was taken to be
the mean of the distribution
of the bottleneck node En.
For this image the bottleneck
node En is larger than the
threshold 0.3.
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Figure 6b: Distribution of
the bottleneck node En of the
used VAE for dog images. En
is the mean bottleneck node
with largest variance within
the dog images of the DogsVs-
Cats dataset.
Figure 6c: The output for
the same as input as for Fig-
ure 6a but with the sign of
En flipped so that (8) is sat-
isfied. Note that while the
background in Fig. 6a was
bright, it is now turned dark.
The Fisher form Fθ however is yield-
ing a value well above 0.5 for a wide
range of the training. After around 15
epochs the AUC for the Fisher form
starts to drop down as well. As this co-
incides roughly with the point where
the accuracy starts stabilizing we sus-
pect that this is a similar effect as
we observed in Figure 3b: Once the
maximal probability of the softmax
output becomes almost identical to
one, this forces the Fisher information
to decrease. In fact it turns out that
after 20 epochs the maximal probabili-
ties on the unusual data are in average
around 99%. Compare this to the tiny
accuracy of 1%! We will focus now on
a point before this, apparently unrea-
sonable, saturation happened, namely
on the trained state after 8 epochs,
marked by a gray cross.
The normalization from (5), for
which we here used the training data,
allows us to compare the behavior of
Hθ(x), HDEθ (x), HBDθ (x) and Fθ(x) for
single datapoints x. As all entropies
show a quite a similar behavior for
this example, we will only compare
HDEθ and Fθ. We drew 1200 images all
showing dogs and depicted the value
of En versus 〈HDEθ (x)〉 and 〈Fθ(x)〉
in Figure 8. Wrong classifications as
cats are marked in red. The median
0.3 of En is drawn as a blue dashed
line, so that the “unusual datapoints”
are below this line. The marginal dis-
tributions of the detection quantities
and of En are shown, split according
11
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Figure 7: Evolution the AUC for detecting
whether a dog image from the DogsVsCats
datset [27] is “unusual” in the sense of (8)
while training on datapoints where (8) is
wrong. As metrics for detecting we use the
entropies Hθ(x), HBDθ (x), HDEθ (x) (in black,
blue and cyan) and the Fisher form Fθ(x)
(in purple). The dashed gray line shows the
accuracy of the trained network.
to classified correctly (in black) and
wrongly (in red).
Note first, that indeed most of
the images satisfying (8) are classified
wrong, so that the network is in fact
not suitable for classifying these data-
points. Moreover, the deep ensemble
entropy is not able to capture that
there is something off with these data.
Even worse, the corresponding points
are cumulated in the lower left corner
which should actually indicate a high
confidence in the prediction for these
points. The Fisher information on the
other hand leads to a cumulation in
the lower right corner and thus cor-
rectly detects many of the “unusual”
datapoints. In fact, even for “normal”
datapoints we observe that most of
those that were classified wrong have
an encoder value En close to 0.3 and
possess again a high Fθ.
4 Conclusion and outlook
We studied the Fisher form to de-
tect whether an input is unusual, in
the sense that it differs from the data
that were used to infer the learned
parameters. Spotting such a disparity
is important, as it can substantially
decrease the reliability. Several ex-
amples for this have been presented
in Section 3. We observed that the
Fisher form performs equally or even
better than competing methods in de-
tecting unusual inputs. In particular,
we introduced a normalization that al-
lows to directly compare these metrics
for single datapoints.
The last example treated in this
article showed an effect, which could
be a starting point for future research.
As we observed in Figure 7 the ability
to detect unusual data might erode
for a too long training. When only
looking at the accuracy for an incom-
plete test set, as we did in Figure 7,
such a process might happen unno-
ticed. This somehow different flavor
of overfitting could be worth studying.
Another point that would deserve
a more detailed investigation is of a
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Figure 8: The behavior of the entropy 〈HDEθ (x)〉 predicted by the deep ensemble and
the Fisher form 〈Fθ(x)〉 for dog images from [27, 28]. The ordinate shows the value of
the bottleneck node En which was used to formulate the criterion (8). Red marks those
datapoints that were classified wrong (as a cat). The histograms show the distribution of
the marginal, again split in correct and wrong classified datapoints.
more conceptual nature. For each
of the examples treated in this work
we used a single network to evaluate
its Fisher form. One might wonder
whether the effect we observed when
considering unusual data will differ for
another network whose training was
carried out with, say, different initial
conditions. As neural networks are
bound to end up in local minima it
is not obvious whether a datapoint
will be unusual for two of these net-
works, even if they are trained on the
same training set. However, this is
not what we observed. In fact, the be-
havior of the Fisher form seems rather
robust in this regard. It is hard to say,
whether this indicates that neural net-
works tend to learn similar patterns
when presented with the same data.
Looking at the quadratic form (3) for
more than only one direction v could
help to shed a bit of light on this ques-
tion.
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Figure 9a: Architecture for
the convolutional neural network
trained on the MNIST dataset that
we use in Section 3.1. For convolu-
tional layers, we marked incoming
channels by the number next to
the arrow.
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with leaky ReLU (0.3)  activations
Fully connected 30
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Mean: 
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10 normally distributed
random numbers
2x Fully connected layers
with leaky ReLU (0.3) activations
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3x Deconvolutional layers
with leaky ReLU (0.3) activations
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Figure 9b: Architecture for the
variational autoencoder we train
on the MNIST dataset and use
in Section 3.1. Note that the
bottleneck is random: From the
10“means” and 10 “variances” in
the bottleneck we construct 10
Gaussian distributions from which
we draw 10 random numbers that
are than feeded through the de-
coder.
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Figure 10a: Architecture for
the convolutional neural network
trained on the Intel Image classifi-
cation dataset that we use in Sec-
tion 3.1. For convolutional layers,
we marked incoming channels by
the number next to the arrow.
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Figure 10b: Architecture for
the fully connected neural network
trained on the Credit Card Fraud
Detection dataset that we use in
Section 3.2.
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Figure 11a: Architecture for
the convolutional neural network
trained on the DogsVsCats dataset
that we use in Section 3.2. For
convolutional layers, we marked in-
coming channels by the number
next to the arrow.
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Figure 11b: Architecture for the
variational autoencoder we train
on the dog images from [27, 28] and
use in Section 3.2. Note that the
bottleneck is random: From the
500“means” and 500 “variances” in
the bottleneck we construct 500
Gaussian distributions from which
we draw 500 random numbers that
are than feeded through the de-
coder.
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